you're reading...

SACT Seminar: Popular Mixed Matchings – An Axiomatic Perspective

Time: 1:00pm Tuesday 19 November.

Location: SIT 459

Speaker: Paul Stursberg, TUM

Paper: Popular Mixed Matchings – An Axiomatic Perspective


One of the most fundamental and ubiquitous problems in microeconomics and operations research is how to assign objects to agents based on their individual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there is no other assignment that is preferred by a majority of the agents. In contrast to pure popular assignments, random popular assignments are guaranteed to exist. The property thus seems suitable as a basis for an assignment algorithm. We study the compatibility of popular assignment algorithms with other properties that have been considered in the literature on random assignments, among them efficiency, equal treatment of equals, envy-freeness, and strategyproofness.



No comments yet.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )


Connecting to %s

Enter your email address to subscribe to receive notifications of new announcements by email.

Join 68 other followers